Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

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The Bill of Rights

First ten amendments to the

United States Constitution

Fourth Amendment

Amendment IV (the Fourth Amendment) to the United States Constitution is one of the provisions included in the Bill of Rights. The Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures, and was originally designed as a response to the controversial writs of assistance (a type of general search warrant), which were a significant factor behind the American Revolution.

1 Text
2 Summary
3 Search and seizure distinguished
4 Searches
5 Reasonable expectation of privacy
6 Searches and seizures without warrants
7 Exclusionary rule
8 Important cases
9 References
10 External Links

[edit] Text

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

[edit] Summary

The Fourth Amendment prevents the federal government from arbitrarily disrupting the autonomy or privacy of the people by requiring that searches and seizures conducted under that authority be reasonable. Toward that end, the amendment specifies that judicially sanctioned search and arrest warrants must be supported by probable cause and limited in scope according to specific information supplied a person (usually a peace officer) who swore by it and is therefore accountable to the issuing court.

The amendment applies to the federal government only, i.e., it does not guarantee the people the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by private citizens or organizations. However, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), that the Amendment was applicable to state governments by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, all state constitutions contain a provision analogous to the Fourth Amendment which provides additional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted under state or federal authority.

[edit] Search and seizure distinguished

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are distinct actions; accordingly, determination of whether governmental authorities have searched within the meaning of the Amendment entails a different analysis than the determination of whether they have seized.

[edit] Searches

To conduct a search, law enforcement must receive permission from a nuetral authority, a court of law or otherwise qualified judicial magistrate. A court grants permission by issuing a warrant. Any search affected without a warrant is presumed by courts to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment; however, courts have recognized a number of intricate exceptions to the warrant requirement (discussed below).

Not all actions by which governmental authorities obtain information from or about a person constitute a search. Therefore, whether government action triggers the Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches depends on whether the information or evidence at issue was obtained through a search. In general, authorities have searched when they impede upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.

[edit] Reasonable expectation of privacy

In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Justice Harlan issued a concurring opinion articulating the two-part test later adopted by the Court as the standard by which to decide whether governmental action constitutes a "search" governed by the Fourth Amendment: to be a "search," (1) governmental action must contravene an individual's actual expectation of privacy; (2) and the desire for privacy must be a reasonable one, in the sense that society in general would recognize it as such.

In order to meet the first part of the test, the person from whom information or evidence was obtained must demonstrate that they, in fact, had an actual, subjective expectation that the information or evidence obtained would not be available to the public. For example, a person who keeps personal letters in a lock box would be able to demonstrate that they did not want the letters to be read by unauthorized persons because they kept them in a secure location.

The second part of Justice Harlan's test is analyzed objectively. The analysis inquires whether society at large would deem a person's expectation of privacy to be reasonable. In other words, if a reasonable person would not deem the expectation of privacy to be a reasonable one, then obtaining the information asserted to be private is not a search within the meaning of the Amendment. For example, there is generally no search when police officers look through garbage because our society does not expect the contents of garbage to be private. (see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)). Similarly, there is no search where officers monitor what phone numbers an individual dials (Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), although Congress has placed statutory restrictions on such monitoring). This doctrine sometimes leads to somewhat unexpected results; in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy (and thus no search) where officers hovered in a helicopter 400 feet above a suspect's house and conducted surveillance.

[edit] Searches and seizures without warrants

A warrant is not necessary for a search or seizure under certain circumstances. Officers may search and seize objects that are in "plain view." Before the search and seizure, however, the officers must have probable cause to believe that the objects are contraband.

Similarly, "open fields"—pastures, open water, woods and other such areas—may be searched without a warrant, on the basis that the individuals conducting activities therein had no reasonable expectations of privacy. Contrary to its apparent meaning, the "open fields" doctrine has been expanded to include almost any open space other than the land immediately surrounding a domicile (for instance, in Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the police ignored a "no trespassing" sign, trespassed onto the suspect's land without a warrant, followed a path several hundred yards, and discovered a field of marijuana. The Supreme Court ruled that no search had taken place. See also: open fields doctrine.

There are also "exigent circumstances" exceptions to the warrant requirement-for instance, if an officer reasonably believes that a suspect may destroy evidence, he might be permitted to seize the evidence without a warrant.

The Supreme Court has also held that individuals in automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy, because vehicles generally do not serve as residences or repositories of personal effects. Vehicles may not be randomly stopped and searched; there must be probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Items in "plain view" may be seized; areas that could potentially hide weapons may also be searched. With probable cause, police officers may search any area in the vehicle. They may not, however, extend the search to the vehicle's passengers without probable cause to search those passengers.

Under common law, a police officer could arrest an individual (arrests constitute seizures, at least for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment) if that individual committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence, or if the officer had probable cause to believe that the individual committed a felony. The Supreme Court has applied the common law rule in American jurisprudence. The officer in question must have had probable cause before making the arrest; evidence discovered after the arrest may not be retroactively used to justify the arrest.

The person must also be under arrest to allow a search to be relevant. A person merely detained, such as someone pulled over for a traffic stop, is not "under arrest"; once the traffic ticket is written there is no right to search without permission as no further search could possibly provide any additional evidence regarding the stop. A search without permission after a speeding ticket was written that discovered marijuana was determined to be unlawful under these conditions. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 US 113 (1998)

Another common law rule—that permitting searches incident to an arrest without warrant—has been applied in American law. The justification for such a search is that the arrested individual must be prevented from destroying evidence or using a weapon against the arresting officer. In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the Supreme Court held that "a search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest." In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court reversed its previous ruling, holding that the officers' opportunity to obtain a warrant was not germane to the reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest. The decision suggested that any area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee could be searched, but it did not define the term. In deciding Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Supreme Court elucidated its previous decisions. It held that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the officer to search the arrestee for weapons and evidence. Similarly, it was held that it is reasonable for the officer to search the area within the arrestee's immediate control, that is, the area from which the defendant may gain access to a weapon or evidence. A search of the room in which the arrest is made is therefore permissible, but the same is not true of a search of other rooms, as the arrestee would not probably be able to access weapons or evidence in those rooms at the time of arrest.

A further exception is the border exception.

The reasonable grounds standard is further applied to searches of homes of individuals on probation. This is to be contrasted with the homes of individuals on parole, who are often required as a condition of that parole to permit searches of their houses or apartments.

It has been held that searches in public schools require neither warrants nor probable cause. (See New Jersey v. T. L. O., 468 U.S. 325 (1985)). It is merely necessary that the searching officers have reasonable grounds for believing that the search will result in the finding of evidence of illegal activity. Government offices may be searched for evidence of work-related misconduct by government employees on similar grounds. Searches of prison cells are subject to no restraints relating to reasonableness or probable cause; neither are searches conducted at the border (the "border search exception") (see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. __ (2004)) or searches undertaken as a condition of parole (see Samson v. California, 546 U.S. __ (2006). Finally, a search is reasonable if the target without coercion consents to the search, even if the target is unaware and not told about their right to refuse to cooperate.

Also, if a police officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a person has committed or is committing a crime, they may affect a limited "seizure" of that person by stopping them and conducting a "frisk" of their person in order to ascertain whether he or she poses a threat to the officer or others by possessing a weapon. (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

[edit] Exclusionary rule

See also: exclusionary rule

At common law, all evidence, no matter how seized, could be admitted in court. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), however, the Supreme Court adopted the "exclusionary rule," under which evidence seized unlawfully is rendered inadmissible in court. The rule was made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The exclusionary rule serves primarily to deter police officers from conducting unlawful searches and seizures. It has, however, a number of exceptions. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court applied the "good faith" rule and held that evidence seized by officers objectively and in good faith relying on a warrant later found to be defective was still admissible. The evidence would still be excluded if an officer dishonestly or recklessly prepares an affidavit forming the basis of the warrant, if the issuing magistrate abandons his neutrality, or if the warrant lacks sufficient particularity. It remains unclear whether the "good faith" exception applies to warrantless seizures. On January 8, 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that grand juries may use illegally obtained evidence in questioning witnesses. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338.

The Supreme Court has held the rule does not apply in certain situations: (1) probation or parole revocation hearings; (2) tax hearings; (3) deportation hearings; (4) when government officials illegally seize evidence outside the United States; (5) when a "private actor" (i.e., not a State employee) illegally seized the evidence; or (6) when the illegally seized evidence is used to impeach the defendant's testimony. Furthermore, a defendant has standing to object to the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence only if such seizure violated his own Fourth Amendment rights; a defendant may not assert the rights of a third party.

Closely related to the exclusionary rule is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, under which the government is prohibited from introducing any evidence that was obtained subsequent to and as a result of the illegal search.

[edit] Important cases

Exclusionary Rule

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
Wolf v. Colorado (1949)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
United States v. Leon (1984)
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott (1998)

Privacy

Olmstead v. United States (1928)
Katz v. United States (1967)
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978)
United States v. Karo (1984)
California v. Greenwood (1988)
Florida v. Riley (1989)
Kyllo v. United States (2001)
United States v. White (2003)
Hudson v. Michigan (2006)

Probable Cause

Spinelli v. United States (1969)
Illinois v. Gates (1983)

Search Warrants

Franks v. Delaware (1979)
Maryland v. Garrison (1987)
Richards v. Wisconsin (1997)

Arrest and Search of a Person Without a Warrant

United States v. Watson (1976)
United States v. Robinson (1973)
Whren v. United States (1996)
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)

Search of and Seizure from a Residence Without a Warrant

Chimel v. California (1969)
Vale v. Louisiana (1970)
Payton v. New York (1980)
Steagald v. United States (1981)
Illinois v. McArthur (2001)

Search and Seizure of Vehicles and Containers Without a Warrant

South Dakota v. Opperman (1976)
United States v. Chadwick (1977)
Arkansas v. Sanders (1979)
New York v. Belton (1981)
United States v. Ross (1982)
California v. Carney (1985)
Colorado v. Bertine (1987)
California v. Acevedo (1991)
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)

Stop and Frisk

Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Florida v. Royer (1983)
Michigan v. Long (1983)
United States v. Place (1983)
Florida v. J.L. (2000)
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
United States v. Drayton (2002)
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004)

[edit] References

[edit] External Links

News and Commentary Articles Related to the Fourth Amendment

	United States Constitution	Complete text at WikiSource

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Formation

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Massachusetts Compromise | Federalist Papers

Amendments

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Interpretation

Categories: 1791 in law | Amendments to the United States Constitution | Rights of the accused